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Claudia RosCiglione
Conscious and Uncoscious Mental States in Nietzsche’s 
Philosophy of Mind
The present paper deals with the following questions: from the standpoint of Nietzsches’ 
philosophy, which is the nature of the mind? Do we have to construe it as a res cogitans 
or rather as the collection of a multitude of various mental states? Answering these ques-
tions implies dealing with a conundrum of contemporary philosophical and scientiic 
debate, that is consciousness. Actually, if – as it will be argued – Nietzsche’s thought 
allows to differentiate unconscious mental activities (Cf. NL 40[15], KSA 11, 635; NL 
14[144], KSA 13, 328–329) from conscious mental ones, it is a long way off saying that 
the mind is identical with consciousness, as Nietzsche maintains the Platonic-Cartesian 
tradition would do instead.
 Nietzsche regards the human being as a complex and stratiied entity, whose con-
scious phenomena are only „End-Erscheinungen“, the latest although not the most impor-
tant link of the organic evolutionary chain (Cf. NL 7[1], KSA 12, 248). According to him, 
the peripherical and central nervous system is very complex, and it cannot be reduced 
only to consciousness. He claims that „there is no ground whatever for ascribing to spirit 
the properties of organization and systematization. The nervous system has a much more 
extensive domain; the world of consciousness is added to it“ (NL 14[144], KSA 13, 329). 
By means of this argument, Nietzsche aims at giving consciousness a new place within a 
wider and more complex domain in a clear anti-Cartesian way. 
 At a general level, there exists something organic, that is the body as a ‚Leib-Organi-
sation‘1, the seat of mental phenomena and what they emerge from. At a particular level, 
there exists the mind that includes both conscious and unconscious mental phenomena. 
Since neither a unique thinking substance nor a unique bodily substance is given, be-
cause the human being is the complex whole of manifold organic and (conscious and 
unconscious) mental phenomena, consciousness is not anything transcendent, separated 
off from and superior to the organic and unconscious mental processes. 
 According to Nietzsche, consciousness is neither causa sui nor inis sui, because it 
requires a multitude of phenomena of different kinds, which lead to the occurrence of 
conscious mental states because of their complexity, but only as one of many equally 
likely outcomes (Cf. NL 34[124], KSA 11, 462). Conscious mental states do not exist for 
1 Cf. Günter Abel, Nietzsche. Die Dynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr, Berlin, 
New York 1984, 157–161. 
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their own sake, rather they are part of the evolutionary chain from which every human 
being stems, who develops indeed for achieving the most likely equilibrium with the sur-
rounding environment, according to Nietzsche’s opinion as well as to an evolutionary and 
Darwinist view.
 In the history of ideas, the Nietzsche – Darwin relationship has been heavily debated 
and considered mainly controversial, also because of the explicit criticism Nietzsche ad-
dressed to certain aspects of Darwin’s theory and, above all, to the interpretation that 
Spencer gave of it. Darwinists are charged by Nietzsche with overrating the instinct of 
selfpreservation, which he claims to suggest that man must repress his own various poten-
tialities for self-preservation. That would imply the prevalence of the „mittleren Typen“ 
and even of „der untermittleren Typen“ over „den höher gerathenen Typen“, „Glücks-
fällen“ (NL 14[123], KSA 13, 303). On the other hand, Nietzsche blames Darwin for 
explaining the evolutionary process almost only by appealing to the organism itting to 
the environment. On this theoretical ground, Nietzsche was rather inclined to adopt the 
biological theory of ‚self-regulation‘ supported by the anatomist and biologist Wilhelm 
Roux.2 Roux recognises the organism to play a role in the inner organisation and subse-
quent new arrangement of the material it receives from the environment. This view does 
not narrow evolution to a itting function. Anyway, this criticism does not bar Nietzsche 
from accepting Darwin’s paradigm, which on the contrary makes up the context within 
which he works up his own theory of ‚self-regulation‘.3
 Accordingly, as far as consciousness is concerned, Nietzsche argues that conscious 
mental states are part of the evolutionary chain, and so they are supposed to give their 
contribution to attaining the man-environment equilibrium that enables man to survive 
and to preserve himself.4 It is just this evolutionary explanation that justiies the ‚natu-
2 Cf. Wilhem Roux, Der Kampf der Theile im Organismus. Ein Beitrag zur Vervollständigung der 
mechanischen Zweckmässigkeitslehre, Leipzig 1881.
3 For Nietzsche-Darwin and Nietzsche-Roux relations see: Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Der Organismus 
als innerer Kampf. Der Einluss von Wilhelm Roux auf Friedrich Nietzsche, in: Nietzsche-Studien, 7 
(1978), 189–235; Jorge Salaquarda, Nietzsche und Lange, in: Nietzsche-Studien, 7 (1978), 230–260; 
Paul Mostert, Nietzsche’s Reception of Darwinism, in: Bijdragen tot de Dierkunde, 49 (1979); C. U. 
M. Smith, Clever Beats Who invented Knowing: Nietzsche’s Evolutionary Biology of Knowledge, 
in: Biology and Philosophy, 2 (1987), 65–91; Werner Stegmaier, Darwin, Darwinismus, Nietzsche. 
Zum Problem der Evolution, in: Nietzsche-Studien, 6 (1987), 264–287; John Richardson, Nietzsche 
contra Darwin, in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3 (2002), 37–575.
4 Cf. NL 2[95], 1885–1887, KSA 12, 107–108. In the contemporary debate on consciousness and the 
mind-body problem, Damasio’s theory seems to approach such an evolutionary explanation of the 
origin of consciousness. According to Damasio, consciousness is „a device capable of maximizing 
the effective manipulation of images in the service of the interests of a particular organism“ that 
by means of this very feature „would probably have prevailed in evolution“, since „survival in a 
complex environment, that is, eficient management of life regulation, depends on taking the right 
action, and that, in turn, can be greatly improved by purposeful preview and manipulation of images 
in mind and optimal planning“ (Antonio Damasio, The feeling of what happens: body, emotion and 
the making of consciousness, London 1994, 24). Edelman’s work (that Damasio himself takes ex-
plicitly into account) seems to point out the same issues. Edelman claims that „an adequate theory of 
consciousness based on brain structure and function must be an evolutionary theory that is consistent 
with the principles of development. If we assume (as any such theory must) that the consciousness 
arose as a result of evolutionary processes affecting brain structures, we will not ind it likely that 
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ralization‘ of consciousness, whose role is narrowed in comparison with that played by 
the body and by unconscious mental states, but not to such an extent that it would be 
deprived of any evolutionary value. Consciousness is indeed what enables the body to 
achieve perfection by satisfying and favoring its organic natural inality (Cf. NL 24[16], 
KSA 10, 655). Were the interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of consciousness limited only 
to his criticism against the Platonic-Cartesian model of consciousness, which brings to 
the fore the charge against it with concealing the humble features of the body, along with 
its instincts, and unconscious processes, the construal of Nietzsche’s thought would likely 
face the risk of underestimating his characteristic evolutionary stance. 
 Instead, to appreciate this standpoint, this paper emphasizes that in Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy of mind a crucial distinction is made between conscious and unconscious mental 
states. Meaningful implications are meant to follow from this distinction. On the one 
hand, Nietzsche always ascribes a conceptual nature to consciousness, or to the collection 
of different conscious mental states. Hence, in the terms of the contemporary philosophi-
cal debate, it can be reasonably maintained that consciousness has always a conceptual 
content. On the other, since conscious mental states are only one part of human beings 
cognitive activity, it can be ascribed to Nietzsche the view that the manifold unconscious 
mental states, which make up the remainder of this conscious activity, have instead al-
ways a non-conceptual content. 
 To Nietzsche consciousness does not exhaust the domain of knowledge, rather it only 
provides schemes in form of concepts and categories that simplify the sense-data mani-
fold, the sensory individuality and difference. As Nietzsche boldly states in the apho-
rism 354 in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, consciousness occurs when a thought „is done 
in words, that is to say, in the symbols for communication“ so that „the development 
of speech and development of consciousness go hand in hand“ (FW, KSA 3, 592). The 
function of consciousness is to turn the individual nature of ‚Sinneseindrücke‘ into what 
Nietzsche calls their „Durchschnittliches“, the „Gemeinschafts- und Heerden-Natur“ in 
which similar things, though different in many respects they may be, are reduced to iden-
tity by constructing concepts in such a way to retain some common features selected 
among many single representational contents and to remove the distinguishing features 
for a successful communication to obtain (Cf. FW, KSA 3, 592). A much more dated 
back work than Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, though not much different as its theoretical 
content, such as Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne, provides us with 
another example of that claim: „Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same 
as another, so it is certain that the concept ‚leaf‘ is formed by arbitrarily discarding these 
individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects. This awakens the idea 
that, in addition to the leaves, there exists in nature the ‚leaf‘: the original model accord-
ing to which all the leaves were perhaps woven, sketched, measured, colored, curled, and 
painted – but by incompetent hands, so that no specimen has turned out to be a correct, 
trustworthy, and faithful likeness of the original model“ (WL, KSA 1, 880). The concept 
of the leaf gets its shape just by letting the individual differences down, because they are 
not conceptualizable, that is they fall out of the conceptual domain. Hence, on the one 
such processes emerged precipitously […]“ (Gerald Edelman, The remembered Present. A Biologi-
cal Theory of Consciousness, New York 1989, 11).
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hand, Nietzsche suggests a genealogy of concepts, which – according to the aphorism 
354 – are a characteristic feature of consciousness, explained as a function of the pri-
mordial self-preservation instinct of man, who must communicate with one another in 
the social dimension for needs of help and protection. On the other hand, he denounces 
the consequence of that conceptualization, that is the thoroughly arbitrary and falsifying 
claim of the existence of primordial shapes, for example that of ‚the Leaf‘ whose pattern 
all the single leaves would be formed upon.
 Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that to Nietzsche consciousness, that is the col-
lection of different conscious mental states, is always conceptual or – borrowing this 
expression from contemporary debate – it has always a conceptual content.5 But since 
according to Nietzsche conscious mental states are only one part of human being’s cogni-
tive activity, the remainder of this activity, that is the manifold unconscious mental states, 
should be supposed to have a nonconceptual content.
 It is no coincidence that in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft Nietzsche claims that con-
sciousness is only an accidental feature of representation (Vorstellung), and contends that 
Leibniz was the irst to notice that (Cf. FW, KSA 3, 598). This implies that the range of 
our mental representations does not coincide with consciousness, and accordingly that 
mental representations do not possess only a conceptual content, as McDowell would 
have it.6 Actually, Nietzsche holds that there are such too ine grained and subtle world as-
pects that cannot be representationally recovered by any conceptual and abstract semantic 
structure. This momentous argument, once it is recognized, allows the interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s theory to emphasize its implications for the contemporary debate about mind 
and consciousness and the structure of their content. 
 Katsafanas claims that in Nietzsche’s thought, conceptual features are the main char-
acteristic of consciousness, while non-conceptual features are the main characteristic of 
unconscious states.7 However, he seems to dwell too little upon the fact that the ine 
grained and rich nature of contents is what makes the content of many unconscious states 
non-conceptual. And according to Nietzsche, it is just that ine grained and rich nature 
that resists any attempt at classiication. As Katsafanas construes Nietzsche’s thought, 
indeed, every mental state can be either conscious or unconscious, since the same per-
ceptual experience might turn from being unconscious or non-conceptual into being con-
scious or conceptual, as soon as it is given an organization by expressible concepts and 
then it is articulated into words. But arguments can be made against the view that the 
content of conscious mental states could be the same as that possessed by unconscious 
states provided that the only difference is its conceptualization by consciousness. The 
speciic feature of the content of unconscious mental states is just its being too rich, ine 
grained and subtle in such a way to escape any form of conceptualization. If we can be 
said to perceive a particular green shade only at a non-conceptual level, because it is a 
too ine grained and subtle content, then it is not possible for it to be also the content of 
a conceptual experience, just because it is not liable to conceptualization. And if we try 
5 See Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford 1992.
6 Cf. John McDowell, Mind and World, Cambridge 1996; cf. NL 11[145], KSA 13, 67 f.
7 It is worth noticing that Cf. Paul Katsafanas, Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind, in: European Journal of 
Philosophy, 13 (2005), 4. 
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to conceptualize it by recording it into the ‚bottle-green‘ or ‚olive-green‘ categories, we 
are going to simplify it or, as Nietzsche would put it, to falsify it somehow, betraying its 
being such and such a rich individual perception. 
 In the same way, Evans reasoned that there is such a ine grained level of the world 
that it escapes concepts, notwithstanding that it can be perceived in a non-conceptual 
way.8 Accordingly, Evans argued for the existence of a non-conceptual content, suggest-
ing that our cognition is such to have a representative content of its own, although it is not 
conceptualizable. 
 Otherwise, McDowell defends the view that an experience endowed with a non-con-
ceptual content could never constitute a true cognitive activity, since experience must 
always have a conceptual content. He reasoned that the ine grained features of, say, 
perceptual color experiences could be arranged by the use of demonstratives, which is 
grounded in the individual sample’s occurrence we can always refer to by such an expres-
sion as ‚that shade‘.9 Were that not the case, it would be not an experience at all, but only 
a blind intuition that would prove thoroughly useless for cognition.10 McDowell concedes 
that there could be concepts that show to have various degrees of determination, but they 
are anyway to be regarded as concepts. 
 Instead, Nietzsche can be supposed not to accept this argument. To him the concept 
as such has a simplifying function that is satisied by removing the differences, that is 
the individual and unrepeatable particularities. Therefore, the concept cannot even re-
tain the ine grained and individual characters of the intuitive impressions that qualify 
as being considered non-conceptual. Nietzsche’s considerations in Über Wahrheit und 
Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne about what he calls ‚plötzliche Eindrücke‘ as well 
as about the ‚intuitive metaphors‘ might be considered as suggesting the existence of 
unconscious perceptual cognitive states. Indeed he claims that these intuitive metaphors 
are individual. Therefore they escape any form of recording or literally any registering 
into a repertoire (‚Rubricieren‘) that is conceptual and show a „starre Regelmässigkeit“, 
a „Kastenordnung“ and the „Reihenfolgen der Rangklasse“ (WL, KSA 1, 882).
  8 Cf. Evans, The Varieties of Reference, 122, 154.
  9 Cf. McDowell, Mind and World, 57 f. 
10 Cf. McDowell, Mind and World, 54 f. Nietzsche’s theory can be construed to meet the criticism 
Crane addressed to the notion of conceptual content as it was worked out by McDowell. Crane 
claims that McDowell takes the conceptual content to be the same as the linguistic content, so that 
the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual contents depends on having a language or 
not. On the contrary, Crane argues that it is possible to have a concept of X without having the 
related linguistic structure, rather merely having only an idea that individuates that kind of X. That 
being the case, McDowell’s argument that the green shade is conceptually graspable by referring 
to it as ‚that shade‘ derives from the fallacy of identifying conceptual and linguistic content. ‚That 
shade‘ is only a linguistic expression that does not possess any of those properties one can ascribe 
to a concept, such as being liable to inference, being eventually recalled or imaged as that particular 
content and being an argument of reasoning once its experience is gone. According to Crane, the 
‚that shade‘ expression does not allow to manage and reprocess the content it refers to except when 
a subject is presented with it. Therefore, a ‚that-‘ expression is nothing conceptual and accordingly 
it does not ensue from it that the experience of that particular green shade would fall under the con-
ceptual domain. See Timothy Crane, Elements of Mind. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 
Oxford 2001, 152–155.
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 Nietzsche often refers to consciousness as something the instinct would oppose to. 
Consciousness would be made up of trials, mistakes, fatigue, while the instinct would be 
embodying the perfection, the thorough naturalness of an action (cf. NL 15[25], KSA 13, 
421). Nietzsche seems to use it elsewhere similarly as it does in the case of the perfect 
mathematician who „employs his combinations unconsciously“ (NL 14[111], ibid. 288).
 Accordingly conscious states are simply those the subject learn something through 
such as the warcraft for the soldier, the combination of symbols for the mathematician or 
the driving skills for a young man. During his learning the subject cannot but paying at-
tention to what he does every time he does it, making errors and learning hardly from his 
own mistakes. But when he learns something in a perfect way, he will do it without think-
ing about it, that is unconsciously or instinctively. The unconscious should be intended 
as something like an automatic process which could not take place were it not preceded 
by such a learning through trial and errors stages as that described by Nietzsche as ‚Be-
wusstwerden‘. Hence unconscious states stem from conscious and attention driven states, 
but they are also always able to change into conscious states as soon as what is done in an 
automatic and instinctive way changes from being implicit into being explicit. 
 But it is necessary to emphasize that this kind of the unconscious has apparently 
nothing to do with those unconscious mental activities Nietzsche singles out at a mainly 
perceptual level which avoid any form of conscious conceptualization and categorization 
because of their individual and subtle characteristics (Cf. NL 11[113], KSA 13, 53 f.; NL 
2[95], KSA 12, 108). In that case it is not a matter of either internalizing something by 
learning until it becomes automatic or making explicit something implicit as it could hap-
pen with the grammatical rules. For instance, in JGB 20 Nietzsche refers to the „gramma-
tischen Funktionen“ as „unbewusste Herrschaft und Führung“ as just something implicit 
which becomes conscious as soon as it is explicated, for example, in grammar books, 
wherein some experts, the grammarians, state explicitly the rules and the structures every 
subject already implicitly complies with without being aware of them. That qualiies as 
the only case for which Anderson’s interpretation could be accepted, according to which 
to Nietzsche concepts are unconscious in the same way the grammatical functions are.11 
But that interpretation is not to overlook that there are some inner and outer perceptions 
that can never be the content of conscious states since they are not conceptualizable and 
linguistically communicable. And the fact that these perceptions are not selected by con-
scious mental activity does not imply that they do not exist. They do exist even though at 
a non-conceptual unconscious level.
 It is in this context that this paper tries to show how Nietzsche’s theory of mind admits 
of a non-conceptual perceptual level to obtain. Making reference again to the aphorism 
375 in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, it is possible to argue that taking consciousness only 
as an accident of representations means to acknowledge the existence of unconscious 
representations, that is of mental states that have a content, which make them represen-
tations, even though they are unconscious given the non-conceptual characteristics of 
their content. That argument implies that perception, which is mainly an unconscious 
representation, is necessarily requested for a cognitive process to obtain (Cf. FW, KSA 3, 
11 Cf. R. Lanier Anderson, Sensualism and Uncoscious Representations. Nietzsche’s Account of 
Knowledge, in: International Studies in Philosophy, 34 (2005), 95–117.
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559). As far as this issue is concerned, Anderson goes as far as arguing for a ‚Nietzschean 
sensualism‘ by the claim that Nietzsche’s theory of knowledge grants priority to the „un-
conscious sensory intuitions“ that grasp the rich and ine grained nature of sensory matter, 
which otherwise just because of these two characteristics is out of reach for conscious 
experience, whose content turns out to be an incomplete and limited rearrangement of 
what experience attains nevertheless by means of the sensory intuitions themselves.12 
 In conclusion, this paper tried to show that Nietzsche assumes the existence of un-
conscious mental states that are different from and irreducible to consciousness, which 
in turn does not coincide tout court with the mind as it is construed by Descartes. Being 
conscious is a property that is shared by some mental states, indeed many but not all of 
them, which coincide with what is usually called mind. This implies that not only the 
mind is no more identiied with the Cartesian res cogitans, but also that mental states 
are manifold and show to possess various characteristics, which ultimately prove to be 
irreducible to one another.
12 Cf. Anderson, Sensualism and Uncoscious Representations.

